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I. Introduction
1. Types of companies in Germany (Aktiengesellschaft [AG] vs. Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung [GmbH])
It might be helpful at the outset to say a few words about the types of companies found within
the German system. Essentially the formal division of corporations in Germany is between
stock corporations or Aktiengesellschaften (AG) and private limited companies (Gesellschaften
mit beschränkter Haftung or GmbH). The differences between these two types of companies
seem greater than those between the English public and private limited companies. AG and
GmbH are governed by different laws, although some basic principles of corporate law apply
equally to both types. As to the liability of directors, both forms have some rules in common,
whereas other rules diverge. I will mention differences in the following where necessary.
2. Management board ("Vorstand") and supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat")
A second specific feature of German corporate law is the separation between a management
board ("Vorstand") and a supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat").
1 This separation is obligatory for
stock corporations and large limited liability companies. The management board consists of
inside directors only and runs the day-to-day business of the firm. The supervisory board is
exclusively made up of outside directors, that is, representatives elected by the shareholders or
appointed by the employees of the firm.
2 The differences between the tasks and duties of the3
management and supervisory boards are reflected also in the standards underlying their
liabilities.
According to provision 4.3 of the Cadbury Code all directors of a British company are "equally
responsible in law for the board's actions and decisions".
3 Such a provision does not exist for
directors of a German company as they are segregated into two groups with different tasks and
duties. My following remarks will deal with the liability of the managing directors only.
II. Functions and Practical Importance
What is the place and function of the liability of managers in our corporate law, and is it of any
practical importance?
1. Principal-agent relationship and liability
Modern microeconomic and legal theories see managers as "agents" and the owners or
stakeholders in a firm as their "principals".
4  The separation between principals and agents
leads to specific problems
5 such as
- traditional conflicts of interests as, for example, unfair self-dealing;
- shirking of managers whose effort cannot be observed;
- positional conflicts. Positional conflicts may occur in a great variety of ways: among
other measures, managers can make it particularly difficult to monitor their
performance, impose high barriers to their own removal, seek to increase corporate
size and so on.
6
Liability of directors is only one of various instruments and devices which have been developed
to align the interests of the management with those of the stockholders, employees, and
creditors of the firm. Other institutional control mechanisms and market forces are:
- incentives in contracts, with the compensation of managers tied to their performance;
- monitoring of the management by the supervisory board and auditors;
- rules of procedure and disclosure in corporate law and provisions against criminal
behaviour in penal law;4
- pressure from the various factor markets (product, capital, labour) as far as these are
competitive;
- monitoring by creditors;
- competition in the market for managers.
Certainly, not all of these devices have the same objectives. The liability rules, for example, are
more concerned with misbehaviour such as self-interested conduct by management, rather than
with monitoring managerial efficiency. It will be one task of my following remarks to describe
the focus and place of these liability rules in our corporate governance system in more detail.
2. Practical importance
How important is directors' liability in practice today? There are no reliable econometric
assessments of this for Germany.
7 Court decisions are comparatively rare, albeit with an
upward tendency in recent years. Most of these decisions deal with two typical situations: The
company is bankrupt, and the trustee in bankruptcy sues the former directors of the company.
The second typical situation is that a former director disputes his pension claims or outstanding
payments with the company and the company defends itself by set-offs with liability claims.
One insurance company reported recently that liability disputes between directors and their
companies are settled outside the courtroom in 90 % of cases.
 8
One could argue that the meaning and importance of liability rules cannot simply be assessed
by looking at court decisions and insurance statistics because the most important task of such
rules lies in their preventative function which is not recorded by those numbers. But this
preventative function itself depends on the appraisal of the liability risk by the directors
concerned. Hence widely published cases and court decisions do play a role also for the
preventative function. I will return to the reasons why there are only comparatively few liability
cases and decisions so far.
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III. Duties of Directors
1. Duties, intentional violation and negligence
The director of a company is, apart from cases of tort, legally liable to his company under the
following conditions:
- first, breach of a contractual or statutory duty owed to the company;
- second, that this breach occurred either intentionally or negligently;
- third, that this has caused damage to the company.
a) No strict liability; no vicarious liability
There is, as in English law, no strict liability of directors which would make managers legally
liable for any loss suffered by the company. Permanent failure or bad performance will, of
course, sooner or later have consequences for the unsuccessful management, but not its
liability for the company's loss. Liability of directors requires the intentional or negligent breach
of directors' duties. Similarly, there is no vicarious liability of directors for the faults of the
company's employees although courts tend to emphasize the organizational duties of directors
in order to prevent mistakes by employees.
10
b) The distinction between breach of duty and negligence
Some basic duties of a director to his company will normally be mentioned in his contract.
Furthermore, our corporation acts list several obligations of the management board and its
members such as to prepare accounts, call meetings etc. Apart from that, the Stock
Corporation Act as well as the Limited Liability Company Act each contain a general basic rule
concerning the liability of directors.
11 These rules say that directors have, in the conduct of
business, to act with the diligence of a prudent business man. Admittedly, at first sight this says
more about how a director has to act rather than what he has to do or should have done. In
other words, these general rules are more concerned with the level of care, skills and
knowledge rather than with the content of the obligations of a director. At least in theory, the
obligations of directors, as, for instance, to prepare the accounts, must be distinguished from6
the question of what level, or standards of care, skill and knowledge a director has to meet and
whether this skill, knowledge etc. were applied actually. In many cases, however, both aspects
reduce to one and the same question. Take a company that has suffered a loss from speculation
in derivatives and sues its directors for not having monitored the respective activities of the
employees closely enough. In such a case the judge will ask what a diligent and prudent
manager would have done in this situation in terms of formulating a policy, organisation of the
derivative business and controlling it. In other words, the court will develop the duties of a
director in such a situation ad hoc, where neither the contract nor the statute says anything
about the concrete oligations of a director in this respect; and the court will develop the
obligation by asking what a diligent and prudent manager would have done. As soon as the
obligation has been formulated it will normally be impossible for the defendant to object on the
ground that he personally did not meet that objective and absolute standard of a prudent and
diligent executive. I return to the objective standard of diligence in German law later.
12 What I
want to emphasize here is, first, that the breach of an obligation and negligence have to be
distinguished in theory whereas in practice in most cases, both aspects reduce to one question,
that is, how a prudent and diligent manager would have acted. Second, that this standard of
diligence is an objective one. That means that the defendant will not be successful, for example,
with the defence that he has acted with similar care to that applied in his own affairs.
2. The content of directors' duties
From the common law systems we know the difference between the "duty of loyalty" and the
"duty of care". Although German law does not differentiate in this way, there are apparent
similarities between both legal systems in this respect. That is unsurprising as they are basically
dealing with the same problems. Little would therefore be gained from listing all these duties
here. Let me mention some differences and peculiarities instead.
a) To whom do directors owe their duties?
One question which might perhaps be more of theoretical interest than of practical importance
is to whom do directors owe their duties.
13 The general rule is that these duties are owed to the
company itself, and that it is primarily the company which has the task of, and the responsibility7
for, enforcing them. This rule prevents shareholders from arguing that the directors owe them
their duties directly as the company itself is not identical with the collective of all shareholders.
There may be, in rare cases, instances where directors owe well defined duties directly to
shareholders; I will return to that.
14 But the general rule is that the directors' duties are owed to
the company itself. There are sophisticated considerations in German legal literature about the
question whether the company is an "enterprise" with all interested groups like employees,
shareholders, creditors and other as "stakeholders" whose interests management has to
pursue.
15 But even those who do not skate on this ice agree that the management is not obliged
solely and exclusively to pursue the interests of the present shareholders. There is no duty to
maximize the value of the shares; management may and has also to take the interests of the
employees, creditors, and the community at large into account. Management has, on behalf of
the company, to act as a "good citizen". It may (and should
16), for instance, make donations to
a university even though its competitors could profit from the research there. It may make
provisions for employees about to lose their jobs even if there is no benefit from this for the
company because it is about to cease trading as a result, say, a merger with another company
or a shutdown.
b) Duties of directors in corporate groups
Let me make one further remark here on the duties of the directors of a subsidiary in a group
of companies. Particularly where it is not a wholly owned subsidiary, its directors must not
subordinate the company's interests entirely to the interests of the other companies in that
group. However, that is not to say that the directors of a subsidiary cannot take the interests of
the group or the interests of the holding company into account. § 317 Stock Corporation Act
states that the director of a subsidiary cannot be held liable for actions taken in the interest of
the group or companies of the group if a respectable and conscientious director of an
independent company would have acted in the same manner.
c) The principles of agency and trust law vs. the concept of directors as "organs"
Although it is agreed that directors owe a duty of loyalty ("Treuepflicht") to their company
17
the range of the fiduciary duty developed by the English law system
18 seems somewhat wider8
and more developed than its German counterparts. That may have to do with the different
concepts and sources or bodies of law from which directors' duties are derived in each system.
Common law falls back on the principles of agency and trust law in order to develop the duties
of directors, whereas German law considers management and supervisory board as "organs" of
a company.
19 This is a concept which shows a tendency to ascribe these organs an autonomous
position and independent competences, and seems less suitable to underline their serving
function.
d) Duty of loyalty and information
Consider an example of the different stages of development of fiduciary duties in each system.
According to Section 317 (1) of the U.K. Companies Act 1985 it is "the duty of a director of a
company who is in any way, whether directly or indirectly, interested in a contract or proposed
contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of
the company". German corporate law does not go that far. § 112 Stock Corporation Act
provides that not the management board but rather the supervisory board represents the
company vis-à-vis its managing directors in order to prevent self-dealing. But this rule does not
apply to contracts with, say, a company in which a member of the management board holds a
majority or to a contract with relatives of a director. There is also, as far as I see, no general
practice in our companies of urging directors to disclose such personal interests to the
supervisory board. In a limited liability company, the position is similar. Here the company may
be represented vis-à-vis its directors even by employees with a power of representation.
20 The
discussion centres only on the question of whether the shareholders must be informed as far as
contracts with the directors themselves are concerned.
21 Only recently, following an incident at
Mannesmann Aktiengesellschaft, the Social Democrats have tabled a bill that would provide
for a disclosure of certain personal business interests of directors to the public.
22
e) Duty of care and business judgement
Moving on to the duty of care and the business judgement rule. At first sight the general
principle in German corporate law that the director of a company has to act with the diligence
of a prudent business man
23 takes a rigorous stance. For it looks as if the "competent
businessman" serves as a kind of a rôle model by which the courts have to assess the acts of
management in an objective manner (and are capable of doing so). There appears to be no9
place for a "business judgement rule" corresponding with judicial self-restraint. But the basic
idea of the business judgement rule - that company law should encourage, and afford broad
protection to, informed business judgements in order to stimulate risk taking, innovation, and
other creative entrepreneurial activities - is also accepted by German law. It is implemented in
two main ways. First, as was already mentioned before,
24 the standard of a "prudent business
man" says more about how a director has to act rather than what he has to do or should have
done. In other words, the courts will themselves develop and crystalise the directors' duties in a
given situation. This leaves room for judicial self-restraint. In an interesting decision in 1992 on
the duties of a company vis-à-vis its bonus-shareholders the Supreme Civil Court ruled that
these shareholders will and may only expect first, that the company keeps within its objectives
and secondly, that their capital investment will not be endangered by actions which "simply no
honest businessman would undertake".
25 This standard would also apply in the context of the
liability of directors themselves.
A second way in which the management is protected from interference in its business decisions
is more doubtful: It has been made particularly difficult regarding stock corporations for
shareholders to sue the management, among other reasons on the grounds that an individual
right of each shareholder to sue the management would paralyze it.
26 As this curtailment of
shareholders' rights does not only affect the duty of care but also breaches of fiduciary duties,
this does not appear a convincing way in which to deal with the business judgement problem.
f) Division of tasks and reliance on others
Directors cannot run the entire business themselves. In larger companies there will always be
joint decisions, depending on the importance of the issue concerned, and a division of tasks.
Where joint decisions are taken by the whole board, each member who has taken part in that
decision will be responsible accordingly. On the other hand, there is no liability for the faults of
the other members of the management board. There is also, at least in principle, no duty to
supervise one's colleagues in fulfilling their duties. Court decisions as well as commentators,
however, take a comparatively rigorous stance here. The importance of certain transactions
may require that a board and its members ask for (prior) information on those issues, and
adopt a policy that they be informed and asked for their consent in advance. And as soon as10
there are grounds for suspicion a co-director will have to act by himself asking for information
etc.
27
On principle, a director is also entitled to rely on information, opinions, judgements and the
like of employees or experts provided that he reasonably believes that these people merit
confidence.
3. The Standard of Diligence
a) Objective and compulsory standard
As mentioned earlier, the breach of a duty and the question of whether it accurred negligently
must be distinguished in theory, although in practice these two questions often merge into one.
The defendant carries the burden of proof to show that he has not acted negligently.
"Negligence" means that the defendant did not act with the diligence of a prudent business
man.
28
That is an objective and comparatively high standard. Directors need not take all possible care
but more than the usual care that might be expected from an ordinary man. The standard is
objective in the sense that a director will not succeed with the defence that he has acted with
such care as he would apply in his own affairs. In this respect the English and German systems
appear to differ.
29 Most commentators hold that this standard is compulsory and cannot be
moderated by the articles of association of the company or the contract with the director.
30
b) Skill and care
These rules apply not only to the care that a director is expected to take but also to the level of
skill, knowledge and experience that will be expected from him. If a director is, as usual,
appointed to run a particular division or field, he has to have the necessary skills and
knowledge. If his own knowledge does not enable him to judge important questions, such as,
for example the derivative business of the company on which the board as a whole has to take
a conclusion, he will have to acquire that knowledge or seek advice and judgement from11
outside experts. If a director has a special skill he will be expected to use it fully and
continuously in the service of the company.
4. The burden of proof
The company or a shareholder challenging the conduct of a director has the burden of proving
that the company has suffered a damage whereas the director has the burden of proving that he
has acted with the diligence of a prudent business man.
31 The problem lies in the differentiation
between breach of duty and negligence in German law.
32 Most commentators tend to place the
burden of coming forward with evidence and the ultimate burden of proof of a breach of duty
also on the director, not on the company.
33 The courts seem more reserved in this respect: As a
principle the plaintiff has the burden of proof of the breach of duty but it will be placed on the
defendant where he has the necessary information on the circumstances or if a presumption
helps the plaintiff as, for instance, in cases of a cash deficit.
34
IV. Enforcement
As to the enforcement of directors' duties and the right of action we have to differentiate
between the stock corporation and the limited liability company.
1. Stock Corporation
Vis-à-vis its managing directors a stock corporation is represented by the supervisory board.
35
This includes the power to commence an action against a wrongdoing director in the
company's name. The problem with this solution is that very often in case of a fault of
managing directors the supervisory board could as well be blamed for not having fulfilled its
monitoring tasks correctly. Hence the supervisory board will normally be reluctant to take
action against a colleague on the management board. Only recently a county court held that the
supervisory board can even be obliged to sue management
36 but this judgement was repealed.
3712
The creditors of an insolvent company can sue management in cases of gross negligence.
38 The
single shareholder does, apart from specific situations in groups of companies,
39 not have the
right to bring a (derivative) action against management on behalf of the company. According
to § 147 Stock Corporation Act the majority of shareholders in a general meeting can decide
that management be sued either by the supervisory board or by special representatives.
Furthermore this paragraph provides that a minority with at least a 10 % share of the
company's capital can demand that the supervisory board or a special representative take action
against managing directors. The problem here is, however, the high threshold of 10 % of the
equity capital. In the case of Daimler Benz, for example, with an equity capital of about
DM 2.3 bn this means that one would have to hold shares with a nominal value of DM 230
million or gather and convince other shareholders with equivalent shareholdings. The second
problem is that the shareholder(s) who bring this action will have to bear all costs and expenses
of the other party and the company should the action be dismissed.
40 The Federal Government
is currently considering an amendment of the rules concerning actions against directors by
shareholders.
2. Limited Liability Company
In limited liability companies without a supervisory board the position is different. Here the
majority of shareholders will decide on actions against managers.
41 There is no right of action
for single shareholders or for a minority in the limited liability company.
42
V. Indemnification, Ratification and Waiver
1. Indemnification
As far as stock corporations are concerned, statutory duties of directors are compulsory except
where the Stock Corporation Act provides otherwise.
43 Regarding limited liability companies,
directors' duties relating to creditors' interests are compulsory whereas duties relating to the
shareholders may be moderated. A different question is whether the general standard that a
director has, in fulfilling his duties, to act with the diligence of a prudent business man, may be
moderated, by provision in the company's articles or in his contract with the company. The13
majority of commentators holds that this standard is compulsory;
44 there are no court decisions
on this.
45
A company may indemnify a director against liability to third parties so long as his action does
not constitute a breach of his duties to the company at the same time, as well as against liability
incurred in any civil or criminal proceedings where judgement is given in his favour.
2. Consent and instructions by shareholders
Where directors are obliged to follow the instructions of the shareholders, their liability will be
excluded accordingly provided that the instruction itself was lawful.
46 This rule is more
important for limited liability companies than for stock corporations where the competences of
the shareholders are very limited. But here also the management could, in order to avoid its
liability, ask the shareholders' meeting for a conclusion on the conduct of business and by that
avoid its liability.
47 The consent of the supervisory board to a certain transaction will not
relieve the managing directors of their liability.
48
3. Legal meaning of the formal approval
At their regular annual meeting shareholders will decide on whether or not to approve the
conduct of business by management and supervisory board during the last year. This formal
approval does not waive liability claims of a stock corporation against its directors.
49 In limited
liability companies, however, the formal approval has a (limited
50) precluding effect.
4. Waiver
Legislation has made waiver and settlement difficult for stock corporations. Only after three
years can the supervisory board waive or reach a settlement of the company's claims, with the
consent of the shareholders' meeting. A minority of shareholders (10 % of the equity capital)
may object,
51 and the waiver or settlement does not preclude a creditor of the company from
sueing the management on behalf of it.
5214
In limited liability companies waiver and settlement depend also on the consent of the
shareholders, but there are no time-limits or formal minority rights.
VI. Liability to Third Parties
In recent years liability to third parties has become more and more important. Listed are some
typical cases and circumstances under which third party liability claims against a director might
arise.
1. Torts and direct claims of the state and creditors
The state may try to achieve its objectives - payment of taxes or contributions to the social
security system - by imposing those responsibilities not only on the company but also on its
directors personally.
53 That means, for instance, that the tax office may collect arrears of
corporation taxes from the company's directors personally, provided that the non-payment is
due to gross negligence of the directors.
Other private third parties may sue the directors of a company in cases of torts committed by
them. "Tort" comprises three cases: First, intentional wrongful injury.
54 Second, breach of an
explicit statutory provision the violation of which entitles to damages.
55 The most important
case here is when the directors of an insolvent company wilfully or by negligence fail to file a
bankruptcy petition
56. Thirdly, wilful or negligent violations of certain defined rights or
protected interests such as life, health or property, which may also lead to personal liability of
directors vis-à-vis third parties. Here the courts developed far-reaching obligations of directors
to make sure by organizational provisions, that rights or protected interests of third parties will
not be injured.
5715
2. Tortious and contractual claims of shareholders
Shareholders of a company would also have personal claims against the company's directors, at
least in principle, under the same conditions, in cases of tort.
58 In German law the directors of a
company are not considered trustees or mandatories of the shareholders. They owe their
contractual obligations and duties to the company itself. This doctrine makes practical sense if,
for instance, in case of a theft the missing amount is repaid to the company and by that the
"reflex damage" suffered by the shareholders is levelled out. There remain, however, instances
where the company as such is not affected and, at the same time, the breach of its director's
contractual obligations is not a tort. One example of this is the negligently wrong information
of shareholders by the directors, on the current financial status of the company. The
shareholders then invest further equity capital and subsequently lose that money because the
firm goes bankrupt. In such cases the shareholders may sue the directors personally on grounds
that they violated their contractual duties to the shareholders of the company.
59 Another
example would be the giving of wrong information to the shareholders in the course of a take-
over of the firm.
VII. Directors' Insurance
Insurance against the liability of directors is a recent development in Germany. The first D&O
insurance was offered in 1986.
60 Cover will normally be taken out by the company which will
pay the premium. The insurance cover that might be taken out would relate to claims by third
parties against the directors, be they domestic parties or claims from abroad. There is also
insurance to cover claims arising from breaches of duties owed to the company itself. The
insurance cover does not extend however, to cases involving wilful breaches of duties, fraud,
dishonesty, criminal behaviour and the like.
Commentators dispute whether the D&O insurance in fact indemnifies the director against his
liability to the company, and is thus void at least in so far as an indemnification ex ante or a
waiver would be void.
61 An insurance without self-retention with the premium paid by the
company would certainly destroy incentives. On the other hand the company would have to
pay the premium as well (as a part of the directors' payment) if he had to take out the insurance
cover in his own name. And at least the blemish remains that the company has suffered damage16
from an action taken by its directors and has raised claims which had to be settled by insurance.
Hence the majority of commentators argues that such insurance cover may be taken out.
The Business Week of September 1986 argued that the position of a director will become "a
job nobody wants".
62 This prediction apparently has not yet come true. But one has to admit
that public awareness and criticism as well as the willingness to raise claims against directors
have been growing ever since. This explains the rising interest in, and importance of, D&O
insurance.17
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